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fact find that bad news about inflation is indeed good news for the nominal exchange rate, that the
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Dollar Rises as U.S. Consumer Inflation Accelerates in February 
March 23, 2005 (Bloomberg) -- The dollar rose against the euro 
after a measure of inflation accelerated last month, bolstering 
expectations the Federal Reserve will raise its benchmark interest 
rate at a faster pace. 
 
1. Introduction 
The interplay between monetary policy and asset prices is a subject of 
longstanding interest in financial economics.  Often – but not always – the focus 
is directed at trying to understand how monetary policy, or shocks to policy, 
impacts asset prices – whether these be the prices of equities, bonds, property, 
or currencies.  Less often, the focus is on how – or should – asset prices 
influence the conduct of monetary policy.  This paper takes a different approach.  
We ask, can the response of an asset price – in our case the exchange rate – to 
a non policy shock – in our case a surprise in inflation – tell us something about 
how monetary policy is conducted? 
This paper makes a theoretical point and provides some empirical support 
for this point.  We show in a simple – but robust – theoretical monetary exchange 
rate model that the sign of the covariance between an inflation surprise and the 
nominal exchange rate can tell us something about how monetary policy is 
conducted.  Specifically, we show that ‘bad news’ about inflation – that it is higher   2
than expected - can be ‘good news’ for the nominal exchange rate – that it 
appreciates on this news - if the central bank has an inflation target that it 
implements with a Taylor Rule.    T h i s  r e s u l t  a t  f i r s t seemed surprising to us 
because our model is one of inflation – not price level – targeting so that in the 
model a shock to inflation has a permanent effect on the price level.  Since PPP 
holds in the long run of the model, the nominal exchange rate depreciates in the 
long run to an inflation shock, even though on impact it can appreciate in 
response to this shock.  We show that in a traditional overshooting model in 
which the central bank sets a growth rate for the money stock, the exchange rate 
would be expected depreciate in response to an inflation shock. 
The empirical work in this paper examines point sampled data on inflation 
announcements and the reaction of nominal exchange rates in 10 minute 
windows around these announcements for 10 countries and several different 
inflation measures for the period July 2001 through March 2005.  Eight of the 
countries in our study are inflation targeters, and two are not.  When we pool the 
data, we do in fact find that bad news about inflation is indeed good news for the 
nominal exchange rate, that the results are statistically significant, and that the     
r – square is substantial, in excess of 0.25 for core measures of inflation.  We 
also find significant differences comparing the inflation targeting countries and 
the two non-inflation targeting countries.  For the non-IT countries, there is no 
significant impact of inflation announcements on the nominal exchange rate, 
although the estimated sign is indeed in line with our story.   For each of the IT 
countries the sign is as predicted by the theory and quite significant.  Finally we   3
study two countries, the UK and Norway in which there was a clear regime 
change during a period when we can obtain data.  We study the granting of 
independence to the Bank of England in 1997 and the shift to formal inflation 
targeting by Norway in 2001.  For both countries, the correlation between the 
exchange rate and the inflation surprise before the regime change reveal that 
‘bad news about inflation was bad news about the exchange rate’.  After the 
regime change, we find that indeed ‘bad news about inflation is good news about 
the exchange rate’.  
  
2. Optimal Monetary Policy in the Open Economy: Some Results                                       
Before we proceed further, it will be useful to review some of the results 
from a model of optimal monetary policy and exchange rate determination in the 
open economy developed in Clarida-Gali-Gertler (2002).  There are two 
countries, each with staggered price setting and facing ‘cost push’ shocks that 
generate inflation inertia.  Home and foreign countries produce differentiated 
traded goods – the terms of trade is a key relative price.  International spillovers 
arise via a marginal cost/optimal labor supply channel, and these impact inflation 
dynamics via staggered optimal price setting as in Calvo. The paper follows 
Woodford and derives the central bank welfare function and the optimal 
monetary policy reaction function in the open economy from taste, technology, 
and market clearing subject to the Calvo pricing constraint.  Solving the model 
under discretion, there are several results that are relevant to the present 
discussion.   4
First, optimal monetary policy in each open economy can be formulated as 
a Taylor Rule 
(1)     i = rr + Eπ+1  +  b (π – π*)  
where i  is the nominal interest rate, rr is the time varying real interest rate, π  is 
inflation, π*   is the inflation target, and E is the expectations operator.  Second, 
under optimal monetary policy, the Taylor Rule is a function of deep parameters  
(2)     b = (σ +  (1 – σ)γ)ξ(1 – ρ) > 0  
where σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, γ is the share of imports in 
the consumption basket, ξ is the elasticity of substitution across varieties of 
intermediate inputs to the production of final output, and ρ is the exogenous 
persistence in shocks to marginal cost.   Third, optimal monetary policy features 
a flexible exchange rate, but the exchange rate itself does not enter the reaction 
function.  Fourth, openness has its effects through the neutral real interest rate 
and the slope of the Taylor Rule.  Fifth, the nominal exchange rate under optimal 
policy has a unit root as does the domestic price level and they are co integrated 
so that PPP holds in the long run.  
Clarida-Gali-Gertler (2002) works out in some detail the symmetric, two 
country Nash equilibrium under central bank discretion.  They show that in the 
symmetric equilibrium, bad news about inflation is good news for the exchange 
rate. That is, a Phillips curve shock that pushes up actual (and expected) inflation 
triggers under optimal policy an aggressive rise in nominal and real interest rates 
that actually causes the nominal exchange rate to appreciate. This is so even   5
though in the long run the nominal exchange rate must depreciate in response to 
an inflation shock. 
There is a tension.  Using uncovered interest parity and long run PPP we 
have (normalizing foreign interest rates and log price levels to zero) 
 
(3)    e  =  -Σj = 0,∞  E  i j   +  Σj = 0,∞  E π j  +  p-1 
 
 
In the long run, the level of the nominal exchange rate must depreciate in line 
with PPP in response to an inflation shock.  Under an inflation targeting monetary 
policy of the sort derived by CGG (2002), after its initial jump the nominal 
exchange rate must be depreciating along the adjustment path (since the home 
nominal interest rate is above the world interest rate when inflation is above 
target).  However, in response to an inflation shock the domestic price level rises 
on impact, which will tend to make the exchange rate weaker.  In the CGG 
(2002) theoretical model, optimal monetary policy has the property that the rise in 
interest rates in response to the monetary policy shock is sufficiently large to 
deliver the association between an adverse inflation shock and an nominal 
currency appreciation. 
 
3. Inflation Shocks in a Dornbusch Style Model 
In a Dornbusch style model with a money growth target, a shock that 
pushes up inflation will, under plausible circumstances, result in a depreciation of 
the nominal exchange rate   Intuitively, in a Dornbusch model with a money 
growth target – but one that accommodates to some extent an inflation shock so   6
that the price level has a unit root - the long run PPP anchor tends to make the 
nominal exchange rate and the price level move in the same direction whether or 
not the shock is to the money supply or to the Phillips curve.  The analysis is 
straightforward. 
  We begin with a money demand equation 
(4)    m – p = -λ(e
e  - e)    
 
where  λ  is the interest semi elasticity of money demand.  Next is a standard  
 
Phillips curve from this literature augmented with an inflation shock term ε. 
     
(5)    p = p-1 + μ  +  η(e  -  p)  +  ε 
 
Next is  a money growth equation, which features the empirically plausible  
 
feature  that inflation shocks are at least partially accommodated.   
 
(6)    m  =  m-1  +  μ  +  f ε-1 
Without this feature, the price level would be stationary in the model, at odds with 
the vast body of evidence that price levels have a unit root and that central banks 
tend to accommodate price level shocks.  We could easily include a permanent 
shock to the money supply, in which case bad news about inflation would be bad 
news about the exchange rate as in the textbook model.  Note that the trend rate 
of growth in the money supply  μ  anchors the trend depreciation in the exchange 
rate.  Finally, we note for future reference that the ex ante real interest rate 
satisfies by uncovered interest parity r  = q
e  - q  with q  =  e  -  p. 
We solve the model for the response of e to an inflation shock.  To 
illustrate our point as simply as possible, we assume that the accommodation 
parameter f  is such that  policy accommodates the inflation shock with a one   7
period lag, and the model reaches new steady state in one period with q
e = 0 .  
We will solve for the unique f that satisfies this condition, which admits an 
intuitive interpretation.  Interestingly, a more general version of this set up, which 
allows for gradual accommodation can feature sunspot equilibria.  Since the 
subject of sunspot equilbria with money growth targeting is not the subject of this 
paper, we stick with the simple example here.  
We can re - write the model as 
(7)    m  -  p  =  -λ(q
e  - q)  - λ(p
e  - p) =  λq  -  λμ 
We have 
(8)    dp =  -λdq 
Thus, if an inflation shock causes inflation, the real exchange rate must 
appreciate under this policy rule.  Actual inflation must satisfy 
(9)    dp =  η dq +  dε 
Collecting terms, under full accommodation (with a lag of one period) 
(10)   (1  +    η/λ)dp =  dε 
Thus indeed, an inflation shock causes inflation so we know the real exchange 
rate appreciates.  The appreciation dampens the impact of the inflation shock so 
that inflation rises less than one for one with the inflation shock.  Even with ex 
ante full accommodation, in the period of the shock the money supply is fixed 
which results in a contraction in demand.  Now, what about the nominal 
exchange rate?  Since PPP holds in the long run and policy fully accommodates 
the shock with a lag, the price level will be permanently higher and thus the 
exchange rate will be permanently higher (weaker) too.     8
There is a presumption that the nominal exchange rate will depreciate on 
impact.  And in fact it almost certainly will in this textbook model.  To see this 
note that  
(11)    de =  dq +  dp =  dp(λ – 1)/λ 
Now λ is the interest semi elasticity of money demand which in empirical studies 
is usually estimated to be much larger than 1 and in calibration models is often 
assumed to exceed 5.  For example, if the interest elasticity of money demand is 
0.5, then starting from an interest rate if 4 percent, a 1 percentage point rise in 
the interest rate is a 25 percent increase in that rate and will reduce money 
demand by 12.5 percent for a semi elasticity of 12.5 Thus there is a presumption 
that that ‘bad news about inflation is bad news about the exchange rate’ in a 
textbook model, both in the long run and on impact in the very short run.  Finally 
note that, for the expectation of full accommodation to be rational the central 
bank must set 
(12)     f  =  (1 +  η/λ) 
Thus while a policy to accommodate may be chosen freely by the central bank, 
there is a unique value of the feedback parameter f that insures this is a rational 
expectation equilibrium.  Note also that even though this central bank is a money 
targeter, an inflation shock will induce the ex ante real interest rate to rise  since 
by UIP, in the period of the  shock 
(13)    dr = - dq  =    (λ +  η)
-1dε   9
Thus a rise in nominal and real interest rates in response to an inflation shock, 
which is a feature of a stable Taylor rule in a wide variety of models, is also true 
under money growth targeting with partial accommodation. 
 
                              
 
 




  In Dornbusch (1976) and Mussa (1982), and in virtually all exchange rate 
papers written until quite recently - including the ‘new open economy’ 
contributions of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, 2000) and the many other papers 
recently surveyed and reviewed in Sarno and  Taylor (2001) - it is the (stochastic 
process for) the supply of money which is the key nominal forcing variable for  
understanding the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate.  Although Mussa 
(1982) in particular allows for a quite general specification of the stochastic 
process for the money supply, in practice theoretical exchange rate models are 
almost always solved under quite simple – and counterfactual – restrictions on 
monetary policy, namely, that the instrument of monetary policy is the stock of 
money.  However, for most of the world’s major central banks, the empirical 
evidence in Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1998) suggests that monetary policy is better 
described by an interest rate rule of the sort first proposed by Henderson and 
McKibbon (1990) and Taylor (1993).   Recent papers by Engel and West 
(2005;2006) and by Mark (2004) have begun to explore some of the empirical   10
implications for exchange rates if central banks follow Taylor rules for setting 
interest rates.  
  The goal of the next two sections is to characterize exchange rate 
dynamics in a more or less standard open economy model in which the central 
bank follows an interest rate rule to implement an inflation targeting strategy.   
The key to solving the model in closed form is to recognize that – as shown in 
Campbell and Clarida (1987) - if the equilibrium ex ante real interest rate implied 
by the Taylor rule exhibits first order autoregressive dynamics, then the 
equilibrium level of the real exchange rate will, period by period, be proportional 
to the equilibrium ex ante real interest rate.  However, the ‘constant’ of 
proportionality that links the real exchange rate and the ex ante real interest rate 
is not a free parameter.  Instead, it is a fixed point in the space of expectations 
for the Markov process which describes the equilibrium inflation process.  We 
show that in this model, conditional on the minimum set of state variables, this 
fixed point is unique and that the equilibrium is stationary  (more  precisely, the 
Blanchard – Kahn (1979) conditions for a unique rational expectations 
equilibrium are satisfied if the Taylor condition is satisfied).            
  Some interesting results are obtained.  We find that in response to a 
temporary ‘Phillips curve’ shock that pushes the inflation rate above target, the 
nominal exchange rate can either depreciate or appreciate on impact, depending 
upon how aggressively - as indexed by the Taylor rule slope coefficient on the 
expected inflation gap - the central bank raises real interest rates to bring 
inflation back to target. Because of inflation inertia, this adjustment does not   11
happen immediately.  We find that the equilibrium half-life of an inflation shock 
(on inflation, output, and the real interest rate) is inversely related to the Taylor 
Rule coefficient on the inflation gap and is directly related to the Taylor rule 
coefficient on the output gap.  Thus, the more aggressive is the central bank 
response to an inflation shock, the faster the economy returns to target. 
However, the more aggressive is the central bank response to the output gap, 
the slower the economy returns to target     
We also examine the dynamic effect of a once and for all permanent 
reduction in the central bank inflation target.  The announcement of a lower 
inflation target causes the exchange rate to appreciate on impact, inducing a real 
appreciation and a recession. Inflation falls on impact , but not all the way to 
target.  Along the adjustment path to the new inflation target, the exchange rate 
is depreciating.  Thus, the  exchange rate overshoots in response to a ‘tightening’ 
of monetary policy.    
 
4.2 A Model 
 
  To illustrate the idea as clearly as possible, we will work with the simplest 
model required. It is a simplified version of the model studied in Svensson 
(1999).  It is comprised of  four equations: an aggregate demand equation, an 
aggregate supply equation, a Taylor rule equation, and an uncovered interest 
parity equation.  The economy is small and takes the world interest rate and 
world inflation as given and equal to 0.  The aggregate demand equation is given 
by    12
(14)    y = - r  +  (e – p) 
where y is log deviation of output from potential, r = i – E π+1  is the ex ante real 
interest rate, e  is the log nominal exchange rate, and p is the log of the domestic 
price level.  The aggregate supply equation is given by 
(15)   π = π-1  +  y  +  ε 
where π = p – p-1 and ε is a white  noise shock to the Phillips curve.  Note that we 
assume  a high degree of inflation inertia so that it is the change in inflation is 
increasing in output gap. This actually will work against the CGG (2002) 
prediction that under optimal policy ‘bad news is good news’ since inflation inertia 
will tend to increase the long run effect on the price level of any given inflation 
shock.  I assume the central bank conducts monetary policy by according to the 
following Taylor rule  
(16)    i = E π+1 + b{  π – π*} + ay  
where π* is the central bank inflation target and b and a > 0.  Finally, uncovered 
interest  parity implies, in real terms 
(17)    e – p  = E{e+1 – p+1} -  r 
We let q = e – p denote the real exchange rate.  Note that e = π + p-1 + q. 
We solve equation (17) forward as in Campbell and Clarida (1987) and 
Svensson (1999) to obtain  q =E lim i -> ∞ q+i - E Σk=0 , ∞ r+k.  Thus, the log level of 
the real exchange rate equals the expected long run equilibrium real exchange 
rate minus the expected undiscounted sum of short-term real interest rates.  In 
our model the long run log real exchange rate is constant and equal to 0, so the 
level of the real exchange rate is  given by        13
(18)   q  =   - E Σk=0 , ∞ r+k. 
We will ‘guess’ - and later verify - that in equilibrium  the ex ante real 
interest rate follows a zero mean AR(1) process so that E r+ j  =  d 
jr with 0 < d < 
1.   As shown in Campbell and Clarida (1987), this implies that 
(19)    q = - r/(1 – d). 
It is sometimes just assumed in models like this (see Ball (1999) for example) 
that the real exchange rate is proportional to the short-term real interest rate.  
Although our model has this feature in equilibrium, d is not a ‘free’ parameter but 
is in fact a fixed point (and as we will see a function of monetary policy) in the 
space of expectations for the stochastic process that describes equilibrium 
inflation.    
 By  substituting  (19) into the aggregate demand curve we obtain                
y = (2 – d)q.  Substituting the Taylor Rule into the real exchange rate equation 
and using the Phillips curve equation, the system can be written as two equations 
in two unknowns, q and π  
(20)    q =  -b(π – π*)/(1 – d) – a(2 – d)q/(1-d)   
(21)   π = π-1  + (2 – d)q  + ε 
From (20) we see that –q {(1-d) + a(2-d)} = r{1 + a(2-d)/(1 – d)} =  b(π – π*).  
Thus, in equilibrium, the ex ante real interest rate is proportional to the inflation 
gap, even though the central bank also seeks to stabilize output.  The dynamics 
of the system are completely described by the following equation 
(22)   π = π-1  - (2 – d)b(π – π*)/{(1-d) + a(2-d)}   +  ε   14
Before moving on, it is useful to pause and understand the logic.  To 
obtain (22), we guessed that the equilibrium ex ante real interest rate follows an 
AR(1) process so that E r+ j  =  d 
jr.  Equation (22) shows that if this guess is 
correct, inflation follows an AR(1) process.  But, from the Taylor rule, if inflation 
follows an AR(1) process, then so does the ex ante real interest rate.  Thus our 
guess is not logically inconsistent.  However, this logic does not prove that there 
exists a unique fixed point in the space of expectations over the AR(1) process 
for r.   Collecting terms, we can  re-write equation (22) as ((π – π*)(1 + (2 – 
d)b/{(1-d) + a(2-d)})  = ( π-1  -  π*)   +  ε.  It follows  that any fixed point in the 
space of expectations for r must satisfy  (1 + (2 – d)b/{(1-d) + a(2-d)}) = 1/d. The 
solutions to this equation are just eigenvalues of the dynamic system when 
written out in Blanchard - Kahn form. It is easy to show that for any a > 0, b > 0 is 
necessary and sufficient for the existent of a unique rational expectations 
equilibrium.  Figure 1 presents the determination of this unique equilibrium.   
  
 
Result 1:  A rational expectations equilibrium exists, is unique, and is stationary.  
The equilibrium persistence d(b , a) in inflation and in deviations from purchasing 
power parity 0 < d(b , a) < 1 depends upon the parameters of monetary policy.  
Persistence is strictly decreasing in b – the Taylor rule coefficient on the inflation 
gap – and strictly increasing in a -  the Taylor rule coefficient on the output gap.     
   15
Thus, for any given Taylor rule coefficients a > 0 and b > 0, there is a 
unique, stationary rational expectations equilibrium.  The more aggressively the 
central bank reacts to the inflation gap (as indexed by the parameter b), the 
faster the economy converges to the long run equilibrium, and the less persistent 
are deviations from PPP.  However, the larger the weight placed on output 
stabilization, (as indexed by the parameter a) the slower the economy converges 
to the long run equilibrium.  Indeed, it is easy to establish the following three 
limiting cases. First, for any given a, as b → 0, d (b , a) → 1.   That is, as the 
weight placed on inflation stabilization goes to zero, inflation and the real 
exchange rate approach a random walk.  Second, for any given a, as b → ∞, d (b 
, a) → 0.   That is, as the weight placed on inflation stabilization goes to infinity, 
the inflation gap and the real exchange rate approach  white noise.  Third, for any 
given b, as a → ∞, d (b , a) → 1.   That is, as the weight placed on output 




An Adverse Inflation Shock 
  A temporary Phillips curve shock  ε > 0 pushes up inflation but by less 
than the shock.  This is because the central bank reacts to the inflation shock by 
pushing up the nominal and the ex ante real interest rate. The real exchange rate 
appreciates on impact.  Output contracts.  The effect of a Phillips curve shock on 
the level of the nominal exchange rate depends upon b, the Taylor rule reaction   16
parameter to the inflation gap.  The following result is easily verified using 
equation (20) and the fact that d is decreasing in b. 
Result 2:  For any given a > 0, there exists a b (a)  such that, for all b > b(a), 
∂et/∂εt < 0. That is, if the central bank  responds sufficiently aggressively to a rise 
in inflation, the nominal exchange rate appreciates on impact in response to an 
adverse inflation shock. For b < b(a), ∂et/∂εt > 0. 
 
Thus while the real exchange rate must appreciate in response to an adverse 
inflation shock, the effect on the nominal exchange rate depends upon the Taylor 
rule reaction function.  Interestingly, the ‘inflation nutter’ case a = 0 and b > 0 is 
not sufficient to guarantee   ∂et/∂εt < 0. 
The impulse response dynamics to an adverse  inflation shock are easy to 
characterize and are shown in Figures 2 and 3.  The nominal interest rate and 
inflation fall monotonically over time at rate d  to π*, and the output gap and the 
real exchange rate rise monotonically over time at rate d   to 0.  Along the 
adjustment path, the nominal exchange rate is depreciating at rate equal to the 
nominal interest rate, until in the steady state it depreciates at the rate π*.   
 
A Cut in the Inflation Target    
  We now consider a once and for cut in the inflation target to π* < π*.  In 
our model, this is assumed to be immediately credible, and to shape 
expectations on impact.  That is, following McCallum, the minimum set of state 
variables for this model is s = {π*, ε, π-1}.   As shown above, there is a unique   17
rational expectations equilibrium corresponding to this state vector and the 
parameters a and b which maps s → {π, y, q, i, E π+1}.  Of course in equilibrium 
the nominal exchange rate and the price level are non-stationary and are a 
function of   {π*, ε, ε-1 , ε-2 ,…}. 
Assume for concreteness that  π -1  = π* and ε = 0.  In the period in which 
the inflation target is cut, the equation for inflation in the period of the regime 
change can be written 
(23)   π = dπ* + π*(1 – d)  
Thus, because of inflation inertia, 0 <  ∂ π / ∂ π* < 1 since d(a, b) < 1 for b. It 
follows that the derivative of the  inflation gap with respect to the inflation target is 
given by     ∂(π – π*)/∂π* = -d.  Thus a cut in the inflation target leads to a rise in 
the inflation gap.   By the Taylor rule, the ex ante real interest rate must rise, and 
thus the real exchange rate must appreciate.  As a result, output declines.   
Indeed it is the induced decline in output that reduces inflation part of the way to 
π*.   Since inflation falls and the real exchange rate appreciates, the nominal 
exchange rate must appreciate as well. 
  We now discuss the impulse response dynamics in periods subsequent to 
the cut in the inflation target. For concreteness, we focus on the case in which 
the new inflation target is zero, π* = 0.  After the regime change, the nominal 
interest rate remains above its new steady state level  of i
SS = π* = 0.  This is 
because the inflation gap is positive.    Thus, along the adjustment path, the 
nominal interest rate is everywhere above the world interest rate of i* = 0, so that   18
the nominal exchange rate must depreciating along the adjustment path.   In 
other words 
 
Result 3:  In response to a cut in the inflation target, the nominal exchange rate 
exhibits overshooting.  That is, it appreciates on impact and depreciates over 
time to its new steady state level. 
 
Thus, if the ‘surprise’ fall in inflation is due to a cut in the inflation target 
(not a Phillips curve shock), good news for  inflation (that it falls) is good news for 
the exchange rate (it appreciates on impact).  Since the model is symmetric, it 
will also be the case that if a ‘surprise’ rise in inflation is due to an increase in the 
inflation target (not a Phillips curve shock), bad news for  inflation (that it rises) is 
bad news for the exchange rate (it depreciates on impact). 
 
  
5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we use data on inflation announcements and the response 
of nominal exchange rates around these announcements to empirically test our 
theoretical model.  We focus on three questions:  (1) What is the sign of the 
correlation between inflation surprises and nominal exchange rate changes?;  (2) 
Is it significant?;  (3) Is it different for inflation targeters and non-inflation 
targeters?   19
Previewing our results, we find that when we pool the data, bad news 
about inflation is good news for the exchange rate.  The sign of the correlation 
between inflation surprises and exchange rate changes is positive and 
statistically significant.  When we separate the data into inflation targeters and 
non-inflation targeters, we find that these results continue to hold for inflation 




Our data set consists of high frequency exchange rate and inflation 
expectation and announcement data.  Below, we describe the construction and 
properties of our data. 
 
Exchange Rate Data 
Our exchange rate data consists of continuously recorded 5-minute 
nominal spot data for nine US dollar crosses: USD-JPY, USD-CAD, USD-NOK, 
USD-SEK, USD-CHF, EUR-USD, GBP-USD, AUD-USD, and NZD-USD.  The 
data, provided by Olsen Associates and Merrill Lynch, begins in July 2001 and 
ends in December 2005.  For GBP-USD and USD-NOK, we also have high 
frequency exchange rate data covering the periods 1993 to 1996 and 1997 to 
2000, respectively.   
We convert the raw spot data to returns, taking 10-minute percentage 
changes.  Although the spot data is recorded at five-minute intervals, we use 10-  20
minute changes, since we are interested in exchange rate behavior during the 
period beginning five minutes before an inflation announcement, and ending five 
minutes after such an announcement. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our 10-minute exchange rate 
return data.  For all nine US dollar crosses, the mean 10-minute return is 0.00%.  
Although the mean returns are similar across currency pairs, the standard 
deviations are not, ranging from 0.05% to 0.09%.  The range of standard 
deviations may be related to the depth and liquidity of markets in different 
exchange rate crosses.  The most liquid currency pairs – USD-JPY, EUR-USD, 
and USD-CAD – have the lowest standard deviations, and the least liquid 




We define an inflation surprise as the difference between the market 
expectation for an announcement and the announced value of inflation.  We 
arrange the data so that a positive surprise indicates that inflation was higher 
than expected, while a negative surprise indicates that inflation was announced 
lower than expected. 
For the 2001- 2005 period, our inflation expectations data is from the 
Bloomberg News Service.  Bloomberg surveys commercial and investment 
banks on their expectations for a wide range of macroeconomic announcements,   21
including inflation.  We use the median of these expectations as the inflation 
expectation for a particular announcement. 
Our inflation announcement data for 2001- 2005 is from the Bloomberg 
News Service as well.  Bloomberg records and preserves the announced value 
of macroeconomic variables, in addition to the revised values.  This is an 
important distinction, as macroeconomic data is often revised in the months 
following its initial release.  Since we are concerned only with the immediate 
response of the exchange rate to an inflation surprise, we need the actually 
announced data. 
In addition to the 2001- 2005 data, we have inflation expectation and 
announcement data for the UK and Norway for the periods 1993 to 1996 and 
1997 to 2000, respectively.  Data for both is provided by Money Market Services, 
and is similar to the Bloomberg data. 
For all countries except the UK, where we use retail prices, we use 
consumer prices as our inflation metric.  For most countries in our sample, 
expectation and announcement data are available for both headline and core 
inflation, where core inflation is headline inflation minus some of the volatile 
components, such as food and energy.  We have up to four different measures of 
inflation for each country in our sample: headline inflation measured as month-
over-month and year-over-year changes, and core inflation measured as month-
over-month and year-over-year changes. 
In Table 2, we present summary statistics for our inflation surprise 
variables.  For most countries in the sample, the mean inflation surprise is slightly   22
less than zero, indicating that forecasters have tended to underestimate inflation.  
However, across all countries and measures of inflation, the absolute value of 
mean inflation surprises is never greater than 0.1 percentage points, indicating 
that any potential bias is small.  The standard deviations for the inflation 
surprises are larger than the means, ranging from 0.1 to 0.3 percentage points. 
 
The Model 
We follow the macroeconomic announcement surprise literature, 
estimating the following equation: 
(24)   Rt = α + βSt + ut   
Here Rt is the ten minute return around the inflation announcement, St is the 
inflation surprise, and ut is the error term.  The exchange rate return is calculated 
so that a positive value indicates an appreciation of the local currency, and a 
negative value represents a depreciation of the local currency.  In all tables, the 
coefficient represents the percentage change in the local currency for a one 
percentage point surprise in inflation. 
 
All Countries 
Pooling data from all countries in our sample and running a stacked OLS 
regression on equation 24, we find that bad news about inflation is indeed good 
news for the nominal exchange rate.  For all four specifications (table 3), the sign 
on the inflation surprise variable is positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that higher than expected inflation results in an immediate currency appreciation,   23
and that lower than expected inflation results in an immediate currency 
depreciation.  The r-squares from the regressions are substantial, particularly for 
the specifications using core inflation, where they exceed 0.25. 
Although the signs are positive and significant for all specifications, the 
results are stronger for the core measures.  The coefficients, t-statistics, and r-
squares are all larger, with coefficients 2.5 times the size of those in the 
regressions using headline inflation, and r-squares nearly three times greater.  
Given the tendency of central banks to focus on core inflation, it is not surprising 
that markets have reacted more strongly to surprises in this measure.   
 
Inflation Targeters versus non-Inflation Targeters 
Our 10-country sample includes eight inflation targeters and two non-
inflation targeters – the US and Japan.  Our groupings are similar to those used 
by the IMF, though the IMF does not include the ECB among inflation targeters, 
as the ECB gives weight to a “reference value” for growth of M3 in the Euro area.  
Despite this dual mandate, we include the ECB in the inflation targeting group, as 
it has lessened its emphasis on the M3 reference value in recent years.   
Including the ECB among the non-inflation targeters would not significantly alter 
our results. 
For our study, the key question is whether or not the sign and significance 
of β are different for inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters.  Separating 
and pooling the data into two categories – inflation targeters and non-inflation 
targeters – we find significant differences between the two.  For non-inflation   24
targeting countries, the impact of inflation surprises is not significant, though the 
estimated sign is generally positive (table 4).  For inflation targeters, the 
estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant in all four 
specifications.  The r-squares are quite substantial for the inflation targeting 
regressions, exceeding 0.30 for both core specifications (table 4). 
Estimating equation 24 separately for each country confirms these results 
(table 5). For the two non-inflation targeters, the coefficients are not significant, 
and for headline inflation in the US are actually of the opposite sign of what the 
theory predicts.  For all eight inflation targeters, the estimated signs are positive, 
and are statistically significant for six of the countries.  These results are 
particularly strong for the core measures, with r-squares ranging from 0.18 for the 
UK to 0.65 for Norway. 
 
Regime Changes 
We can also test whether our results hold when there is a clear regime 
change over time.  To test this, we study the granting of independence to the 
Bank of England in 1997 and the shift to formal inflation targeting in Norway in 
2001.  For both countries, we have nominal exchange rate and inflation 
expectation and announcement data prior to and following the regime shifts.   
For both countries, the correlation between inflation surprises and nominal 
exchange rate changes is positive and significant for the 2001- 2005 period, 
indicating that when central banks in both countries were inflation targeters, bad 
news about inflation was good news for the exchange rate.  However, prior to the   25
regime changes in both countries, the estimated coefficients were negative 
(though not statistically significant), implying that bad news about inflation was 
bad news for the exchange rate (table 6). 
Sign Effects 
Finally, we examine whether or not the reaction of the nominal exchange 
rate differs according to the sign of the surprise.  We separate the data into three 
categories: higher than expected inflation, lower than expected inflation, and as 
expected inflation.  We discard observations where inflation was as expected, 
and pool the remaining data for all countries into two groups – positive inflation 
surprises (bad news) and negative inflation surprises (good news).  We then 
estimate equation 24 for both (table 7), though we omit the constant in the 
regression. 
Doing so, we find that although the coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant across all specifications, the effect is stronger for negative 
inflation surprises (good news) than it is for positive inflation surprises (bad 
news).  The coefficients, t-statistics, and r-squares are substantially higher for the 
regressions that use negative inflation surprises.  Thus, for equivalent inflation 
surprises, good news will have a larger impact than will bad news. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have presented what is apparently a new empirical 
regularity - that for inflation targeting countries, bad news for inflation is good 
news for the exchange rate.  There are two antecedent for this empirical finding   26
of which we are aware. The paper by Anderson, et. al. (2003) who report in their 
tables, but don’t discuss, that for some dollar exchange rates during the 1990s 
inflation surprises and exchange rates covaried in the way reported in this paper, 
but the estimated effects were not significant.  In Goldberg and Klein (2006), it is 
shown that for most of the sample 1999 – 2005, that bad news about inflation 
was bad news for the Euro, but that bad news about inflation become good ners 
for the Euro starting in 2003.  They interpret this as consistent with improved 
ECB credibility during the period.  Faust, et. Al. look at 14 years of data for the 
US and find that bad news about inflation is bad news for the exchange rate.   
Our findings are also related to but distinct from those in much cited paper by 
Engel and Frankel (1984) and the paper of Hardouvelis (1984).  They looked at 
the  effect of money supply surprises (not inflation surprises) on the exchange 
rate.  They argued that if a money growth targeting regime were credible, then a 
surprise increase in the money supply – that pushed money growth above target 
- would be expected to be reversed and that this would cause the nominal 
exchange rate to appreciate, which is in fact what they found for the Fed and the 
dollar in the early 1980s.    We have presented a simple theoretical model that 
delivers the prediction that under certain inflation targeting regimes, bad news 
about inflation can be good news for the exchange rate.  This is a ‘workhorse’ 
model that does not require the two country dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium framework with optimal monetary policy as featured in Clarida, Gali, 
Gertler (2002), and yet it delivers a similar prediction.   What can these results 
tell us about monetary policy?  They suggest two conclusions.  First that the   27
inflation targeting regimes in the countries featured in our sample are sufficiently 
credible that they anchor expectations of inflation and the monetary policy path 
required to achieve the inflation target to such an extent that the currency 
becomes more valuable upon receipt of news that inflation is surprising high.  
This credibility effect has to be strong enough to counterbalance the long run 
PPP anchor which would tend to depreciate the currency on the impact of bad 
inflation news.  We note that this is exactly what we find for the Bank of England 
before independence and for Norway before the adoption of inflation targeting.    
A second conclusion is that a credible inflation target is not enough for the ‘bad 
news is good news’ effect to prevail.  In other words, we cannot conclude that if 
bad news about inflation is bad news for the exchange rate, that a central bank is 
not an inflation targeter.  The central bank must raise interest rates sufficiently 
aggressively to an inflation shock, and not just greater than one for one as 
required by the Taylor principle.   In particular, this observation is important for 
correctly interpreting the results for the US and Japan, for which we did not find 
significant evidence of the ‘bad news is good news’ effect.   Especially in the 
case of the Fed, we do not interpret our results necessarily as evidence against 
Fed credibility in anchoring inflation expectations.  They are also consistent with 
the Fed’s anchoring those expectations in the context of its dual mandate.  
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Impulse Response to Inflation Shock – ‘Good News’ Case 
b > b(a) 
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Figure 3 
Impulse Response to Inflation Shock – ‘Bad News” Case  
b < b(a) 
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AUD-USD NZD-USD EUR-USD
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Standard Deviation 0.07% 0.09% 0.05%
GBP-USD USD-JPY USD-CAD
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Standard Deviation 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
USD-NOK USD-SEK USD-CHF
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Standard Deviation 0.07% 0.07% 0.06%
Table 1: 10-Minute Exchange Rate Returns
 
 
MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY
Mean -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
Standard Deviation 0.21 0.23 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.14
MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY
Mean -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03
Standard Deviation 0.27 0.30 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19
MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY
Mean 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.10 0.12
Japan US
Headline Core Headline Core
Headline Core Headline Core
Norway Sweden
Headline Core Headline Core
Canada UK




QoQ YoY MoM YoY QoQ MoM YoY
Mean -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07
Standard Deviation 0.18 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.20 0.23
Headline Headline Headline
Australia Euro Area Switzerland
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MoM YoY MoM YoY
Coefficient 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5
T- Statistic 5.9 6.2 9.7 9.2
R-Squared 0.08 0.09 0.27 0.25
# Observations 394 387 257 259
Regression method: stacked OLS.
Percentage change in exchange rate resulting from a one percentage point upward surprise in inflation.
Positive coefficient indicates appreciation of domestic currency.
Countries: Australia, Canada, Euro area, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US.
Data: July 2001- December 2005. Some countries missing observations.
Headline Core





MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY
Coefficient 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.01 -0.08 0.1 0.1
T- Statistic 6.1 6.7 9.4 8.9 0.2 -0.8 1.3 1.1
R-Squared 0.11 0.13 0.37 0.31 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
# Observations 286 310 152 182 108 77 105 77
Regression method: stacked OLS.
Percentage change in exchange rate resulting from a one percentage point upward surprise in inflation.
Positive coefficient indicates appreciation of domestic currency.
Inflation targeters includes: Australia, Canada, Euro area, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.
Non-inflation targeters includes: Japan and US.
Non-inflation targeters YoY includes only Japan.





Table 4: Inflation Targeters versus Non-Inflation Targeters
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MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY
Coefficient 0.07 0.04 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
T- Statistic
  OLS 1 . 20 . 85 . 03 . 3 2 . 93 . 13 . 34 . 0
  White 1 . 41 . 06 . 32 . 8 2 . 22 . 62 . 83 . 3
  Newey-West 1 . 20 . 96 . 72 . 7 1 . 92 . 12 . 32 . 7
R-Squared 0.02 0.01 0.47 0.19 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.23
# Observations 54 54 30 50 53 54 50 54
Percentage change in exchange rate resulting from a one percentage point upward surprise in inflation.
Positive coefficient indicates appreciation of domestic currency.
Data: July 2001- December 2005. Number of observations may be less than total months due to missing observations.
White and Newey-West used to correct for potential heteroscedasticity.







M o MY o YM o MY o Y M o MY o YM o MY o Y
Coefficient 0 . 50 . 61 . 31 . 3 0 . 30 . 20 . 20 . 2
T- Statistic
  OLS 2 . 83 . 57 . 57 . 7 3 . 43 . 33 . 13 . 1
  White 2 . 32 . 45 . 75 . 4 3 . 63 . 03 . 33 . 2
  Newey-West 2 . 02 . 16 . 65 . 7 3 . 43 . 12 . 92 . 9
R-Squared 0.19 0.27 0.65 0.64 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.20
# Observations 35 35 32 35 41 42 40 42
Percentage change in exchange rate resulting from a one percentage point upward surprise in inflation.
Positive coefficient indicates appreciation of domestic currency.
Data: July 2001- December 2005. Number of observations may be less than total months due to missing observations.





Table 5b: Individual Country Results
Core
 




QoQ YoY MoM YoY QoQ MoM YoY
Coefficient 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1
T- Statistic
  OLS 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 3.0 2.9 3.1
  White 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 3.3 2.7 3.0
  Newey-West 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 3.2 2.7 3.4
R-Squared 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.38 0.16 0.16
# Observations 18 17 54 54 17 48 53
Percentage change in exchange rate resulting from a one percentage point upward surprise in inflation.
Positive coefficient indicates appreciation of domestic currency.
Data: July 2001- December 2005. Number of observations may be less than total months due to missing observations.










MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY MoM YoY
Coefficient 0.07 0.1 0.07 0.07 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.2
T- Statistic
  OLS 1.4 1.8 1.0 0.7 -0.4 -1.1 0.9 0.7
  White 1.2 1.9 0.8 0.7 -0.4 -1.1 0.9 0.7
  Newey-West 1.3 1.6 0.7 0.7 -0.4 -1.2 0.9 0.8
R-Squared 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.02
# Observations 54 54 51 52 54 25 54 25
Percentage change in exchange rate resulting from a one percentage point upward surprise in inflation.
Positive coefficient indicates appreciation of domestic currency.
Data: July 2001- December 2005. Number of observations may be less than total months due to missing observations.





Table 5d: Individual Country Results
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Norway
Core Headline
MoM YoY YoY YoY
Coefficient 0.006 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08
T- Statistic
  OLS 0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -1.0
  White 0.1 -0.7 -0.8 -1.6
  Newey-West 0.1 -1.1 -1.4 -1.6
R-Squared 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
# Observations 46 46 46 40
Percentage change in exchange rate resulting from a one percentage point upward surprise in inflation.
Positive coefficient indicates appreciation of domestic currency.
Dates: Norway: August 1997- December 2000. UK: March 1993- December 1996.
Number of observations may be less than total months due to missing observations.
White and Newey-West used to correct for potential heteroscedasticity.
UK
Headline




Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Coefficient 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.6
T- Statistic 2.4 5.1 2.5 5.4 4.9 7.1 4.1 7.2
# Observations 126 164 113 169 80 98 83 102
Regression method: stacked OLS.
Percentage change in exchange rate resulting from a one percentage point upward surprise in inflation.
Positive coefficient indicates appreciation of domestic currency.
Countries: Australia, Canada, Euro area, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US.
Data: July 2001- December 2005. Number of observations may be less than total months due to missing observations.
Positive indicates inflation higher than expected - bad news.
Negative indicates inflation lower than expected - good news.
MoM YoY MoM YoY
Table 7: Good News Versus Bad News
Headline Core
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The end 